N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 402

Thursday, July 10, 1947 (Morning session)

matters, it is plain to see that there would be no uniformity of decision in such matters. There must be a central control in the court, and as I have said, one conscience to guide. There must be a uniformity of practice and decisions to the end that a Chancery judge in one part of the State will not decree a case in one way and another Chancery judge in another part of the State decree a similar case in another way. All deviations from established practice or principles must have the sanction of the Chancellor. Yet there is no inflexibility of principle or practice because the Chancellor is always free to authorize an adaptation or extension of established remedies and principles to new facts or circumstances.

I am a believer in specialization in those dispensing justice, particularly in the nisi prius courts or those of first instance.

There are four divisions of law inherent in any jurisdiction where the system of Anglo-American law is in force, whether they be administrated by separate courts or in a single court. The argument for specialization cannot be put better than that done by Mr. Arthur T. Vanderbilt in the report of the Judicial Council to the Legislature submitting "Proposed constitutional amendments relating to the Judiciary." It reads:1 Report of the Judicial Council of New Jersey to the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, May 31, 1932. Trenton, 1932. Pages 45 - 46.

"Shall we, then, set one judge to administering all the law, civil, criminal, equity and probate, as in the federal courts, or shall we, so far as possible, recognize that there is a vast difference in the subject-matter of the four systems of law, wide variation in the weapons and machinery in each, and some predilection in every lawyer and every judge in favor of one branch of the law as against the other?

No chief executive of any large business enterprise in our complicated economic and financial system today would dream of expecting every one of his associates to be an expert in every branch of the business. The scope of the law is wider than any business; it embraces not only all business, but practically every form of human activity. The law schools, moreover, recognize the principle of division of labor, for each instructor is expected to be an expert only in the one or two subjects he teaches, and not an authority on the entire body of law. If those who merely teach the law as a science find it necessary to limit their field of activity, how much greater is the need of doing so for judges who must not only know their law as a science but administer it as an art?

In drafting the proposed constitutional amendments, the Judicial Council has, therefore, accepted as its first principle the division of labor among the judges in the administration of these four bodies of law, and has, so far as possible, provided for their administration by different sets of judges. It is our belief that this makes for competency and expertness, not only on the bench but at the bar, and gives the citizens of the State a better quality of justice. There is less wasted effort, less wear and tear on the human beings concerned as judges, lawyers, litigants, witnesses and jurors than would result were each of our judges required to administer all the law. Finally, this principle of division of labor in our courts and at the bar finds its ultimate justification in our experience with it for nearly three centuries."

Dean Pound, whom you had the pleasure of hearing last week, in his work on Organization of Courts (1941), at page 253, in considering various types of wastage of judicial man power characteris-

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