N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 535

Wednesday, July 30, 1947 (Afternoon session)

mit the Chief Justice to assign judges of the General Court indiscriminately to the Chancery Division or the Law Division. It may be that in the beginning a judge, once assigned to the Chancery Division, would remain there, but there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a continuous flow of personnel from one court to the other.

Now, the proposed Article does not abolish equity. I don't think it was the intention of anybody to abolish equity as a system of jurisprudence, as distinguished from law, and we are going to have equity administered in this State whether or not we have the integrated court proposed or whether we have a separate Court of Chancery. The only question is whether or not the public of this State will be so well served by the integrated court as they would be served by a separate court. So far as I am concerned, it will make no difference. I will go on earning my living practicing law in the same way at the same stand, but I think the public will be injured if the separate Court of Chancery is abolished.

My reasons for that belief are simple. I have discussed this question a number of times with laymen. I find it difficult to convey my thoughts to them on the subject, because to understand the difference between law and equity requires an understanding of the two systems; because, without it, the type of thinking that is required in a Chancery case as distinguished from a law case is so different that by my merely stating it I feel that when I talk to these laymen I don't get the idea across. I tell them that when a man sits on an equity case the type of thinking, the type of philosophy, the type of experience which he brings to that case is something that can come to him only after years of dealing in the subject of equity to the exclusion of law, if you please.

It is the same as if we listen to the music of the Orient. It is expressed in a different idiom. The composers have something to say, but to our western ear it means nothing. It is the same as when we look at a picture painted in the classical tradition. We understand it. We look at the modern artists. They have something to say. They have a different idiom of expression to us, or to many of us, or to me at least. I can't understand them. So it is with law and equity. While the demarcation isn't so sharp as between western music and eastern music, or between modern art and classical art, yet the demarcation is there. The thinking and the experience and the philosophy that are necessary and inherent in equity as distinguished from law are so different that you must deal with equity all the time in order to express it properly.

Now, I've been here since 12 o'clock and I've heard some remarks made about the great benefits that have come to other states as a result of the merger of law and equity. I wonder if those statements can be supported? I recall that when I first came into

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