N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 537


STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Wednesday, July 30, 1947 (Afternoon session)

it be judicial, professional, or lay, to understand everything.

Equity in this State has been a growing, living thing. In other states it has atrophied and in some instances died. The example I have given you about the relief given to distressed owners of real estate by the Court of Chancery administering equitable principles, is the best illustration of the statement that in another state equity has died as a result of the merger, although lip service is given to it as a system. There is no extension of equitable principle. For a man to be creative, for a man to do something that isn't covered by precedent, he must know his tool, and he can't know his tool when he has twice the tools that any man can be expected to master in the space of one short life.

Now, I note that in this proposed Article there is a provision concerning compulsory retirement at 70. I don't think that in a fundamental charter any age should be mentioned. That matter should be left to the Legislature to deal with, depending upon changing circumstances. We should not lay down a prohibition that may seem silly in years to come when it may be possible that human life, by the use of some medicine or chemistry, may be prolonged.

There is another provision here which appears in the Schedule. I refer to paragraph 7 of the Schedule, wherein the various causes presently pending are transferred to other courts. A provision like that should not be included as it has been. The last part of paragraph 7 reads (reading):

"Causes shall be deemed to be pending for the purposes of this and the next paragraph, notwithstanding that an adjudication has been entered therein, until the time limited for review has expired."

I want to call the Committee's attention to the fact that in the Court of Chancery numerous, hundreds and perhaps thousands of decrees have been filed which grant what we lawyers call final relief with respect to the subject matter that was then brought before the court. But at the foot of the decree there is reserved the right to the party to come back in that cause for further relief as occasion may require. I wonder what the effect of this provision would be if it is left in its present form, because the time for appeal has expired in those cases with respect to the subject matter that the decree dealt with, but nevertheless the parties have the right to come back into that cause. It would seem to me that that class of cases would be left floating around with nobody knowing where they belonged and with a serious question open whether there was the right to institute a new suit in the new court, by whatever name it may be called.

Thank you for your attention.

VICE-CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Danzig. ... Mr. Hannoch.

MR. HERBERT J. HANNOCH: Mr. Chairman, and gentle-


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