N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 685

(Copy of letter sent to President Robert C. Clothier by Augustus C. Studer, Jr., Esq., June 16, 1947, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

it has attained over the centuries presents the only real serious danger confronting us at this time. To lay violent hands on the Court of Chancery is at once to weaken us in maintaining our constitutional liberties, our property rights, our freedom of speech and of the press, and our religious freedom as well. It is only by the maintenance of an undiluted stream of equity that these rights can properly be evaluated and efficiently protected. Once that stream is unreasonably weakened by impact with the rigidities of the law, its virtue and its strength are to that extent enervated and dissipated. To maintain that peculiarly nice balance of reason which is so often required in equity, demands the best thought which can be evolved in each age. The court of equity must, and is intended to reach out into the entire field of human knowledge and human experience in its deliberations and yet withal it must stay its own hand where there is an adequate remedy at law. This limitation is of tremendous import and requires the careful thought of experts to the end that the constitutional right of trial by jury may be maintained in its proper sphere. Indeed, to follow this equitable maxim requires the seasoned approach of men extremely well skilled in the niceties involved. The chancellors of old were the keepers of the King's conscience, the modern Chancellor is the keeper of the consciences of all of us and that of the government as well. So it is that the court of equity today, in the exercise of its injunctive and prerogative powers, may say to the rich and to the poor, to the strong and to the weak and as well to the government itself, so far you may go and no farther. Its jurisdiction now over the many delicate and perplexing problems which had their origin in the Revealed Law as it was developed in the ancient ecclesiastical courts, ranging as it does over the entire field of family relations, emphasizes further the necessities of specialization.

It was discovered at an early date that the rigorous and rigid application of the rules evolved in courts of law were, in many instances, inadequate to render justice in its fuller sense. To cast these subjects into the hands of law judges who today are specializing in the legalistic atmosphere of contracts, torts, and criminal law is to weaken the purity and brilliance of equity and put a brake upon its progress in the myriad and everchanging problems of our daily lives. Do not misunderstand me in this. I am not contending the law judges can not and may not make excellent chancellors. I am urging however and I hope with some emphasis, that once a law judge is authorized to function in the court of equity he should remain there continuously to perfect himself in the reasoning which pertains to that court. Nor am I contending that the equity court is of more importance in our jurisprudence than the law courts. They are equally important in their respective spheres and, right here in New Jersey, working separately until

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