N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 686

(Copy of letter sent to President Robert C. Clothier by Augustus C. Studer, Jr., Esq., June 16, 1947, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

they meet in the appellate court, they have spelled out the best that can be found anywhere in the English speaking world.

As I understand it, no one today advocates or desires to destroy equity as a specialized subject on the theory that it is outmoded. No one would for a moment advocate that it should not be maintained as a definitely separate study in our law schools or that its maxims so well known to our lawyers should be ignored and forgotten. The fact is, it is evolving today as ever, in the correction of "that wherein the law by reason of its universality is deficient," and one may well devote a lifetime within its precincts, ever striving in progressive attempts to fathom that infinite concept we speak of as Justice. The Chancellor and his vice-chancellors live and labor within their sphere in full realization that the perfection of reason is not yet attained but toward that goal they must direct their intellectual efforts with all the integrity of thought and brilliance of expression they are capable of exercising. I know of no branch of the law wherein the jurist is left so free to meet the everchanging conditions of our technological development. To order a judge, who sits day in and day out in the trial of law cases, to gather up his gown and his bag and move over to the consideration of cases in the highly specialized sphere of equity doesn't seem to me to be at all reasonable. Nor is it reasonable to expect that one steeped in equity can, with alacrity move over into the trial of jury cases. In each such instance, the judge's little black book of citations and the notes of his daily experience become useless to him. Reading the opinions of some of the outside judges who have had their training in jurisdictions where law and equity are not dealt with in separate courts, we are often confused in the language they use, and a study of semantics is necessary to get at the gist of the matter. More often than not the difficulty is that the writer has had a confused notion of what equity really is and cannot express himself with that clarity which flows from a special knowledge of it. For example: A day or two ago a case was cited here from the Supreme Court of a state where equity is not specialized in. The judge there says: "A court of law is a dangerous place for masquerade, for law looks beneath the apparent and beholds the real." How true and how much more satisfactory it would have been, had the judge worded it in the language of our late Chancellor Magill when he said in the Stockton case, "Equity looks at the substance, not merely the outward form." The foreign judge apparently did not understand that he was dealing with a maxim in equity. There is no such maxim in law. Chancellor Walker following on later said in the Earle case, "Now an appeal is made to a court of equity, which penetrates all disguises of form and, disregarding the shadow grasps the substance." In this same case he further said: "The principles of equity will be applied to new cases as they are presented, and

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