N.J. Constitutional Convention: Vol. 4, Page 72

Wednesday, June 25, 1947 (Morning session)

about from one of the king's courts to another, at great cost, and with needless delay, upon grounds which have no justification of utility or public policy. It used to be just as if a surgeon, when called in to a patient, were forbidden to give any medicine or afford any relief except it were surgical."

The lawyer members of the Committee will bear me out on this.

VICE-CHAIRMAN: They are a substantial minority.

MR. SCHNITZER: This is technical, - every suit instituted in the Court of Chancery must allege that the plaintiff or petitioner has no adequate remedy at law. Now, those who argue that Chancery judges should be specialists must take into account that a Chancery judge, in every case, must know the law pretty thoroughly before deciding whether or not there is an adequate remedy. Are we to suppose, since he practices Chancery law, that his decisions as to the legal remedies available are second-class decisions? You won't find anybody who will advocate or admit that point of view, and in my conception, it isn't true that they are necessarily second-class judges with respect to any phase of their work.

From Mr. Conford you will or have heard that most of those who advocate a retention of the Chancery Court in some form or other, insist that both the Court of Chancery and the law courts should hereafter dispose of each case as it comes before them in all its aspects, just as in the federal court or in the courts of most other states. If the argument on the phase of specialization has validity, the result is bound to be that if a law trial occurs in Chancery, we will get a first-class decision on equitable phases of the case and an inferior determination on the legal phases, just because the judges never get a chance to become specialists in the legal cases. If we begin in a law court, the situation will be true in reverse. Now, certainly we ought not to have an unfair administration of justice, depending upon the accident of where the particular case happens to originate, and yet if there is validity in the argument of specialization, such would be the case. Practical experience would dictate that the opportunity should at all costs be given all our judges to become specialists by practicing in the entire domain of jurisdiction.

Again, the arguments in favor of an independent Court of Chancery will emphasize the high prestige and regard which the New Jersey equity court has commanded within and without the State. But if the assertion that the equity court does command prestige is correct, we know that the law in the equity court was made not by Vice-Chancellors, but by the Court of Errors and Appeals, on review of their decisions. The Court of Errors and Appeals reviewing Chancery decisions is comprised of the Chief Justice, eight Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and seven lay judges, who may or may

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